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Abstract
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory
standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the
microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a
macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to
address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and
interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what
they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime as it then existed. It then summarizes the
provisions of Basel III to allow for an evaluation of whether it was an effective response to
the causes of the financial crisis.
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1. Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory
standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the
microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a
macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to
address the critical factors the BCBS identified as contributing to the financial crisis:
1. That troubled banks held an inadequate amount of capital and that the capital they
did hold was of an insufficient quality (Capital Reform)
2. That even adequately capitalized banks experienced difficulties due to insufficient
liquidity (Liquidity Standards)
3. That the interconnectedness of financial institutions transmitted shocks across the
financial system and the broader economy (Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness)
Each of these three areas is examined in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this
module. The discussion focuses on Pillar 1 of the Basel framework. (For an overview of
Pillars 2 and 3 of the Basel framework, see YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al 2014A.)
Capital Reform: Under Basel III, banks must improve both the quantity and quality of their
capital. The minimum ratio of common equity to risk-weighted assets (RWA) has been
increased from 2% to 4.5%, with total capital required to represent at least 8% of RWA. A
capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and a countercyclical buffer of between 0% and 2.5%
have also been introduced. Additionally, Basel III establishes a leverage ratio requiring banks
to maintain Tier 1 capital that is at least 3% of total exposure.
Liquidity Standards: Basel III introduces two new liquidity measurements. Under the
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, banks must maintain a sufficient quantity of high-quality liquid
assets to cover expected outflows in a 30-day stressed funding scenario. The Net Stable
Funding Ratio, on the other hand, compares available funding sources with the funding
needs associated with the banks’ assets and exposures. In addition to these standards, Basel
III introduces several liquidity monitoring tools for banks to use on an ongoing basis to
report information to regulators.
Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness: Basel III includes several measures aimed at
addressing the threat of contagion given the interconnectedness that exists in the financial
markets. Higher capital requirements have been given to systemic derivatives and interfinancial exposures, and a capital surcharge of 1% to 2.5% in common equity has been
introduced for banks deemed systemically important. Additionally, the BCBS has established
a Large Exposure Framework that limits the exposure an internationally active bank can
have to a single counterparty.
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
updated risk-based capital requirements established by Basel III. Section 3 outlines the
leverage ratio intended to serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital requirements. Section
4 introduces the new liquidity standards that Basel III has made a part of the Basel
framework. Section 5 discusses the provisions of Basel III targeted at the systemic risk
stemming from interconnectedness.
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Questions
1. What were the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis, and what do those causes
suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime as it then existed?
2. Is Basel III an effective response to the causes of the financial crisis?

2. Capital Reform—Risk-Based Capital Requirements
In the wake of the financial crisis, the BCBS concluded both that troubled banks held an
inadequate amount of capital and that the capital they did hold was of an insufficient quality.
To combat this, Basel III requires banks improve both aspects of their capital base.
Basel III’s emphasis on improved quality revolves around a refinement of the tiered
approach to defining capital introduced by Basel I and carried forward by Basel II. Under
Basel III, “Tier 1 Capital” is intended to allow a bank to remain a going concern by absorbing
significant losses while remaining solvent. To accomplish this, the Basel III framework calls
for the majority of Tier 1 Capital to be common equity. This is reflected in the updated
minimum capital standards set forth in Basel III, which require banks to maintain “Common
Equity Tier 1” of at least 4.5% of RWA and total Tier 1 Capital of at least 6.0% of RWA.
“Tier 2 Capital,” on the other hand, is considered “gone-concern capital” under Basel III and
is intended to absorb losses to protect depositors in the event of insolvency. With Basel III’s
elimination of Tier 3 Capital, Total Capital is defined as the sum of Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2
Capital and must equal at least 8.0% of RWA. (To review Basel III’s definition of Common
Equity Tier 1, Tier 1 Capital, and Tier 2 Capital, see pages 12 through 28 of Bank for
International Settlements rev. 2011.)
In addition to the minimum capital requirements outlined above, Basel III establishes two
capital buffers: (1) a capital conservation buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 equal to 2.5% of
RWA “which is designed to ensure that banks build up capital buffers outside periods of
stress which can be drawn down as losses are incurred” and (2) a countercyclical buffer of
Common Equity Tier 1 equal to between 0% and 2.5% of RWA (to be determined on an
ongoing basis by national regulators) intended to “build up additional capital defenses in
periods where the risks of system-wide stress are growing markedly.” (See Bank for
International Settlements rev. 2011, 54 and 57.)
The resulting capital framework is shown in Figure 1 below (For a detailed discussion of how
RWA is calculated for purposes of the risk-based capital requirements, see YPFS Case Study
McNamara, et al. 2014D.):
Figure 1: Capital Requirements and Buffers (all numbers in percent)
Common Equity Tier 1

Tier 1 Capital

Total Capital

Minimum

4.5

6.0

8.0

Conservation Buffer

2.5

Minimum plus Buffer

7.0

8.5

10.5

Countercyclical Buffer range

0-2.5

Source: Bank for International Settlements rev. 2011, Annex 1.
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3. Capital Reform—Leverage Ratio
The risk-based capital requirements outlined above necessarily involve significant
complexity, with each of a bank’s assets needing to be assigned a specific risk weight. As
outlined in greater detail in another YPFS Case Study (McNamara, et al 2014D), since Basel
II, banks have had the ability to make use of internal models in calculating RWA, resulting in
what critics have described as an ability to “game the system” by meeting the new
requirements through overly aggressive modeling that keeps RWA artificially low. Thus, as
a backstop to the risk-weighted capital requirements and because during the financial crisis
“[i]n many cases banks built up excessive leverage while still showing strong risk-based
capital ratios,” Basel III introduces “a simple, transparent, non-risk-based leverage ratio that
is calibrated to act as a credible supplementary measure to risk-based capital requirements”
(Bank for International Settlements rev. 2011, 61).
The leverage ratio established by Basel III is derived by dividing Tier 1 Capital by total
exposure (calculated consistent with the accounting measure of exposure), subject to certain
adjustments:
•

On-balance sheet, non-derivative exposures are net of specific provisions and
valuation adjustments (e.g., credit valuation adjustments)

•

Physical or financial collateral, guarantees, or credit-risk mitigation purchased are
not allowed to reduce on-balance sheet exposures

•

Netting of loans and deposits is not allowed

•

Off-balance sheet exposure, commitments (including liquidity facilities),
unconditionally cancellable commitments, direct credit substitutes, acceptances,
standby letters of credit, trade letters of credit, failed transactions, and unsettled
securities are fully included in the exposure measure while for any commitments that
are unconditionally cancellable at any time by the bank without prior notice, banks
must apply a credit conversion factor of 10% to include such commitments in the
exposure measure.

The minimum leverage ratio set forth in Basel III is 3%.

4. Liquidity Standards
As part of Basel III, the BCBS introduced liquidity standards to the capital requirements that
have historically been the cornerstone of the Basel regime. This decision is very clearly a
product of the nature of the financial crisis of 2007-09, which was a crisis not only of
inadequate bank capital, but also of inadequate bank liquidity. As the BCBS has noted,
“[d]uring the ‘liquidity phase’ of the financial crisis that began in 2007, many banks—despite
adequate capital levels—still experienced difficulties because they did not manage their
liquidity in a prudent manner” (Bank for International Settlements 2013b, 1).
With the financial crisis having illustrated the importance of ensuring that banks maintain
both adequate capital and liquidity, the BCBS has proposed two new liquidity standards as
part of Basel III—the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio. The former
is a short-term measure that evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected
cash outflows during a 30-day stress scenario. The latter is a long-term structural measure
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that evaluates the amount of funding available from stable sources relative to the funding
needs of the bank’s assets.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
The purpose of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is to “promote the short-term resilience
of the liquidity risk profile of banks by ensuring that they have sufficient [high quality liquid
assets (HQLA)] to survive a significant stress scenario lasting 30 calendar days” (Bank for
International Settlements 2013b, 4). Underlying this 30-day standard is the belief that by the
30th day of a stress scenario, bank management and regulators will have had adequate time
to take steps to address the situation, including corrective actions by management and
regulators, central bank intervention, or the orderly resolution of particular banks. The LCR
evaluates banks’ ability to survive to the 30th day by comparing the stock of HQLA to the total
net cash outflows anticipated over the 30 calendar days.
Under the LCR, a bank would begin by determining the value of its stock of unencumbered
HQLA (assets that can be easily and immediately converted into cash at little or no loss of
value) in stressed conditions. The stock of HQLA can include different categories of assets,
with the LCR calculation setting limits on and applying “haircuts” (discounts from the current
market value) to certain types of assets. For example, corporate debt securities with a rating
of AA- or higher and a record of liquidity are included in the Level 2A category of assets, a
category to which a 15% haircut is applied and which, along with Level 2B, is limited to 40%
of total HQLA.
The bank would then divide the value of its stock of unencumbered HQLA by the value of the
total net cash outflows from the bank expected to occur over the next 30 calendar days given
stressed conditions. To calculate total expected cash outflows, the bank would multiply the
outstanding amounts of various types of liabilities and commitments by an expected run-off
rate designated for each liability or commitment type by the BCBS. For example, retail
deposits covered by typical deposit insurance have an expected run-off rate of 5%, reflecting
the belief of the BCBS that approximately 5% of such deposits will be withdrawn in a 30-day
stress scenario. Banks must also include other potential sources of cash outflows, including
increased liquidity needs related to credit downgrades and collateral calls and drawdowns
on committed lending facilities. The calculation of total cash inflows, in turn, requires that
banks look only to contractual inflows (including interest payments) from fully performing
exposures for which there is no expectation of default during the 30-day window.
Significantly, the amount of inflows to cover outflows has been limited to a maximum of 75%
of outflows. This means that banks must hold HQLA of at least 25% of their outflows
regardless of expected inflows.
By dividing the value of its stock of unencumbered HQLA by the value of total net cash
outflows expected to occur over the next 30 calendar days given stressed conditions, a bank
arrives at a percentage that reflects its ability to readily meet immediate liquidity demands
in a stress scenario. The timeline established by the BCBS calls for banks to achieve an LCR
of 60% by January 1, 2015, and an LCR of 100% by January 1, 2019. Thus from 2019 onward,
the idea is that banks will be able to survive a significant stress scenario lasting up to 30 days
without resorting to the sale of illiquid assets to meet liquidity demands. (For a more detailed
examination of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and how it has already affected one key area of
the financial markets, see YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al. 2014F.)
Net Stable Funding Ratio
Coming out of the financial crisis, the BCBS also identified a need “[t]o promote more
medium and long-term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations” to
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prevent the reoccurrence of a balance sheet mismatch that created significant problems in
2007-09—the use of short-term funding to back long-term assets and exposures (Bank for
International Settlements 2010, 25). With this in mind, the BCBS has proposed a Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR) “to reduce funding risk over a longer time horizon by requiring banks
to fund their activities with sufficiently stable sources of funding” (Bank for International
Settlements 2014a, 2). In order to achieve this, the NSFR evaluates a bank’s available amount
of stable funding (capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over a one-year timeframe)
relative to its required amount of stable funding (based on the liquidity characteristics and
residual maturities of the bank’s assets and off-balance sheet exposures). The NSFR
mandates that the ratio of available stable funding (ASF) to required stable funding (RSF) be
at least 100% on an ongoing basis. Thus, the less liquid and longer-term a bank’s assets and
exposures, the more stable funding it will need to have available to it.
Figure 2: Net Stable Funding Requirement

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2014a, 6.)
Under the NSFR framework, the calculation of total ASF requires a bank to assign the
carrying value of all of its capital and liabilities to one of five categories created by the BCBS
to reflect differing degrees of maturity and likelihood of withdrawal. Each of these five
categories has a corresponding ASF factor that indicates the percentage of the capital and
liabilities in that category that may be included in the calculation of ASF. These categories
and their ASF factors are shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Summary of Liability Categories and Associated ASF Factors

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2014c, 6.
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Similarly, to calculate its RSF a bank must assign each of its assets to one of several categories
created by the BCBS with corresponding RSF factors “intended to approximate the amount
of a particular asset that would have to be funded, either because it will be rolled over, or
because it could not be monetised through sale or used as collateral in a secured borrowing
transaction over the course of one year without significant expense” (Bank for International
Settlements 2014a, 6). For example, the highly liquid assets included in the first four RSF
categories receive RSF factors ranging from 0% to 15% reflecting the fact that the bank could
with relative ease sell or use the assets as collateral to raise funds within the one-year NSFR
timeframe.
For the complete set of RSF categories, see Figure 4. (For a more detailed examination of the
Net Stable Funding Ratio and how it may already be affecting one key area of the financial
markets, see YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al. 2014G.)
Figure 4: Summary of Asset Categories and Associated RSF Factors

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2014a, 9.
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In addition to these new standards, Basel III introduces several new liquidity monitoring
tools intended to “capture specific information related to a bank’s cash flows, balance sheet
structure, available unencumbered collateral, and certain market indicators,” with results
shared with the relevant financial regulators (Bank for International Settlements 2013, 40).
A summary of these liquidity measuring tools is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Basel III Liquidity Measuring Tools

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2013, 40.

5. Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness
As the BCBS has concluded of the financial crisis, “excessive interconnectedness among
systemically important banks also transmitted shocks across the financial system and
economy” (Bank for International Settlements rev 2011). The BCBS has made addressing the
systemic risk created by this interconnectedness a cornerstone of Basel III. In addition to the
basic risk-based capital requirements described above, Basel III established a higher loss
absorbency requirement for institutions deemed to be global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs). This requirement, currently ranging from Common Equity Tier 1 equal to between
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1.0% and 2.5% of RWA, reflects a determination by BCBS that the minimum capital
requirements of Basel III “are not sufficient to address the negative externalities posed by GSIBs or to protect the system from the wider spillover risks of G-SIBs” (Bank for International
Settlements 2013a, 3). Under the Basel III framework, determinations about which banks
qualify as G-SIBs subject to the requirement are based on “a global, system-wide loss-givendefault concept” that evaluates institutions in five equally weighted categories comprised of
individual indicators:
Figure 6: Indicator-Based Measurement Approach

Source: Bank for International Settlements 2013a, 5-6.

Under Basel III, banks seen as systemically important because of their cross-jurisdictional
activity, size, interconnectedness, lack of substitutability, and/or complexity must thus
maintain even more capital. (For a more detailed discussion of the higher loss absorbency
requirement for G-SIBs, see pages 2-15 of Bank for International Settlements 2013a.)
In addition to the systemic risk and interconnectedness provisions contained in Basel III
itself, the BCBS in 2014 also adopted a “Large Exposure Framework” intended to limit, as a
percentage of the bank’s eligible capital, the amount of exposure an internationally active
bank can have to a single counterparty. In general, the Large Exposure Framework prevents
banks from having an exposure to a single counterparty that is higher than 25% of the
effective amount of its Tier 1 Capital. For exposures between global systemically important
banks, this limit is reduced to 15%. The purpose of these limits is to ensure that banks
“consistently measure, aggregate and control exposures to single counterparties or to groups
of connected counterparties across their books and operations” so that “the maximum loss a
bank could face in the event of a sudden counterparty failure [is limited] to a level that does
not endanger the bank’s solvency” (Bank for International Settlements 2014b, 1). (For a
complete description of the Large Exposure Framework, see Bank for International
Settlements 2014b.)
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